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Introduction
A stock market of any country is a very difficult object for assumptions and
studies. The main reason is that prices in the stock market, in comparison to the market of
material goods, are mainly defined by expectations of the participants in the trading
process than by external objective economical factors. The internal factor is especially
strong in the formation of developing markets, where it is most obvious that the stock and
financial markets are relatively independent.
In the classical works it is assumed that there is a firm relationship between the
stock prices and the expected discounted flow of dividends. This approach is not
acceptable for the estimation of the Russian stock market, since the companies prefer to
pay no dividends or the dividends are miserable. Thus in Russia there is no stable
correlation between the price of a stock share and financial perspectives of its emitter.
The speculative interests of the market participants and any information of possible
merges of companies play the crucial role.
The Russian futures stock market has been actively functioning almost during two
years till May 1998, when the main trading place --- the Russian stock market --- ceased
to operate. This time is characterized by a rapid, almost five-times, increase in prices on
the stock market and by an even more rapid decrease in them. How did the futures market
react on this dynamics? To what extent could the futures price of contracts forecast the
future spot price of stocks? The present paper tries to give answers to these questions.
In Section 1, to analyze the situation in the stock market in the period from
September 1995 to September 1998, we divide the entire observation time into intervals
each of which is characterized by it own political and economical situation in the country.
Due to the existing tradition, all the prices are in American dollars but the trade is
carried out in Russian roubles. The exchange course is defined by the Central Bank of
Russia. There were few main considerations that we used in the description of the
dynamics of the Russian stock market. If for the most part the stock trade is carried out
by  Russian residents without any significant participation of foreign capital, then one
hardly can expect any significant diversion in the dynamics of stock prices and that of the
gold and currency reserves of the Central Bank. In the Russian market there is a high
correlation between the RTS Index and the gold and currency reserves of the Central
Bank. If, in addition, there is no direct correlation between changes in the reserves and
the net foreign trade deficit, one can assume that the most important role in the Russian
stock market is played by intentions of foreign investors and possible changes in the
political situation are more important for them than  for the national investors.
In this period, the short-term market of state bonds (GKO) and related debt
instruments was a very important reference point in the financial market. To describe this
very complicated market, we study the following three indices: GKO-90, GKO-180,
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Thus the time series describing the dynamics of synthetic bond indices, the RTS index,
and the gold and currency reserves of the Central Bank form the basis for the descriptive
analysis of the stock market
Looking for analogs of the Russian stock market among the stock markets of
other countries, we paid our attention to the stock market in Venezuela whose dynamics
is very similar to that in Russia.
In Section 2 of the present paper we study some theoretical aspects related to
realization of simple arbitrage strategies. As far as we know, many of these strategies
were successfully used by some broker companies in the Russian futures and spot
markets. Here we also formulate some criteria, which allow one to decide, taking into
account the GKO market and the  borrowed capital market, whether a situation arising in
the stock markets is favorable for using a particular arbitrage strategy.
In Section 3 we statistically analyze possible arbitrage strategies in the Russian
stock market during the period from November 1996 to May 1998 by using, as an
example, the two most liquid stocks  of NK Lukoil and RAO EES. This analysis shows
that there were rather long time periods during which pure arbitrage operations were
possible, i.e., it was possible to «make money from air». The existence of this possibility
made the Russian financial market very attractive, and one could hardly expect that banks
would invest in the real sector of economy where the rate of return was not very large.
Moreover, there were rather long time periods when quasi-arbitrage operations
were possible. The rate of  return obtained in these operations by participants possessing
a  primary capital was significantly larger than that obtained in the GKO-market under
the same costs.
Despite these facts,  the futures market could provide average estimates of relative
changes in the spot prices of stocks without any statistically significant deviations.
Thus the existence of a large number of possibilities for realization of arbitrage
strategies does not contradict the fact that there are unbiased estimates of the rate of
return  via known prices of  futures contracts.
1.  History of the stock and  internal State debt markets in Russia in 1995-98 .
The actual market history of the Russian economy originates from 1992--1994.
Several fundamental laws in privatization and credit-money policy adopted in this period
laid the foundation of the existing Russian market institutes.
3It should be noted that, in practice, although a law is adopted, this does not mean
that all existing financial and economical institutes and economy objects transform
immediately. The process of constructing new market institutes is rather long. Only
starting from 1995, one can say that the Russian market institutes and the market
infrastructure operate in the same way as it is known in developed western countries.
Since each separate market simultaneously deals with numerous  purchase-and-
sell objects (stocks, bonds, futures contracts, etc.), one can completely describe the stock
and GKO markets only by introducing some aggregate instruments, i.e., stock market
indices.
There are many methods for constructing stock market indices, which differ in the
base access (in quantity and the name of stocks included into the calculational set of the
index) and in the calculational formulas.  In many countries, several tens of different
indices are sometimes calculated in the stock markets. These indices show, for instance,
the dynamics of company stocks in different industry branches or of stocks comparable in
liquidity (the daily trade volume). How to analyze the behavior of different stock market
indices is the theme of a separate paper. Here we restrict ourselves to the study of the
RTS index of the stock market and to three indices of the GKO--OFZ market.
The RTS index. The RTS index is being calculated from September 1, 1995. The
RTS listing includes stocks of practically all the largest Russian companies (except for
RAO "Gasprom"). The RTS index is weighted with respect to the company capitals and
thus shows their market value. The index access referred to September 1, 1998 includes
88 stocks.  The RTS index can be calculated by the recurrent formula
where Cap is the capitalization of the stock market at a corresponding time instant. At the
initial time instant (September 1, 1995) the index was equal to 100.
During  the four years under study, the RTS index is de-facto the most important
factor of the entire Russian stock market for the majority of participants in the market. It
is related to the large trade volume in the RTS (much more than the corresponding factor
of the stock markets) and to a large amount of bonds listed in the RTS  (this factor of the
RTS is also larger than that of the stock markets).
In contrast to any unweighted (speculative) index, the RTS index is much more
stable under sharp oscillations of prices of single stocks, since the main contribution to
the index is made by companies with large capitalization. As a rule, the stocks of such
companies are extremely tolerant to a momentary behavior of individual players.
To demonstrate an essential difference in the dynamics of the Russian and
American stock markets, in Fig. 1 in Appendix we show the RTS index and the Dow-
Jones average during the time period  in question. The solid line shows the polynomial
trends of these indices. A rapid increase and a more rapid decrease in prices in the stock
market are special features of  the state of affairs in the Russian stock market from
September 1995 to October 1998.
The GKO-OFZ market indices. In contrast to the stock market, where the stock
market indices are widely used, aggregate indices are less common in the state bond
market.  First of all, this is related to the fact that it is impossible to formulate a fixed
access for such an index, since all GKO issues have a bounded lifetime.  At the same
time, the effect of studying several issues separately is very small, since they, first,
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4strongly depend on the behavior of the separate operators and, second, have a clear
dynamics during their life, i.e., the price is increasing while the interest is decreasing.
Thus the main distinction between the «usual» stock market indices and the GKO
indices is that the latter must have a «floating» access. In other words, the set of issues
contained in the base access must vary constantly. For each separate issue, its payment
period (in days) is a criterion for including it into the access (or for excluding from it).
Since the most important factors characterizing the bonds (the price and the interest)
depend on the payment period, it is not a lucky idea to include all bonds into the same
index. One of possible solutions of this problem is to use several GKO-indices (for
example, three), which characterize the short-term, medium-term, and long-term bonds,
respectively. This distinction also has a historical background. During 1993—1996 there
was a strict division of issues (three month bonds 21XXX, half-year bonds 22XXX, year
bonds 23XXX).  Thus we propose to use indices that, at each time instant, include bonds
shown in Table1.
Table 1.
Index Number of days till the
repayment of bonds
included into the index
Base period of maturity in
days (T)
short-term index GKO_90 60-120 90
medium-term index
GKO_180
150-210 180
long-term index GKO_270 240-300 270
To calculate the corresponding price index and the daily trade volume of all bonds
included into the index, we calculate the price of a synthetic bond by the formula
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5Here T= 90, 180, or 270 for GKO_90, GKO_180, and GKO_270,  respectively;
n is the number of GKO issues traded on the corresponding day t and having the
date of maturity in the required interval (T-30; T+30),
P(t)   is the price of the corresponding synthetic bond on the day t,
Vi(t)  is the trade volume f the i-th issue on the day t,
365   is the number of days in the year,
100   is the (nominal) price of the bond.
The total volume of all traded bonds in a given interval is the trade volume for the
desired synthetic bond.
Figure 1 shows how the four aggregate indices of the Russian stock market
depend on time (compared during the same time period). The following time series are
considered: the RTS index (the RTS variable), the gold and currency reserves of the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (the GCR_4 variable) in mill. Doll. USA, and the
prices of GKPR_180 and GKPR_90 of the synthetic GKO with 180- and 90-day periods
of payment.  The scale of the variables GKPR_180 and GKPR_90 corresponds to the
nominal price 100. We used the data observed from February 1, 1996, to August 14,
1998,  i.e., to the time instant at which the Government defaulted on payments for short-
term bonds. Since GKO-bonds  were sold four days a week, all our data correspond to
these days. For GCR-4 we approximate the Central Bank data  linearly and then average
over four days.
The dynamics of the Russian stock and bond  market is subject to many factors
both political and caused by the state of affairs in other sectors of the financial market,
i.e., in the currency and state bond markets. It is worth noting that there is a high
correlation between the stock market and gold and currency reserves of the Central Bank
of the Russian Federation, as well as the stock markets in other countries. However, all
these correlations are not stationary. Therefore, starting from political and economical
factors that has been acting in Russia since 1995, we divide the observation time into
stages. The passage from one stage to another is determined by certain events that happen
outside the market but significantly affect the dynamics of its factors.
The natural bounds of these time intervals are important political and economical
events that occurred in this period and significantly affect the participants in the Russian
stock market. We divide the time-period from January 1995 to August 1998 into seven
time stages by using the currency rate dynamics, the price dynamics for synthetic GKO
bonds with 90-, 180-, 270-day payments periods, and the information on the RTS index
variation which characterizes the Russian stock market outside the stock exchange.
Stage 1. January--May 1995
The first stage is the period in which the Russian State debt market was formed.
The currency corridor introduced at the end of 1994 and some other severe measures
taken to stabilize the rouble gradually made the rates in GKO--OFZ market very
attractive to investors (150-180% at the beginning of this stage), since they allowed high
rates of currency return. In this period an important role is played by the active struggle
with inflation. This struggle results in a significant decrease of this macroeconomics
6factor (from 17.8% in January 1995 to 5.4% in July). At this stage the Government could
evolve such rigid policy by using the stabilization credits given by the International
Monetary Fund.   In this period the dollar exchange rate grew from 3500 roubles per
dollar till 5000 roubles per dollar.
Stage 2. June--July 1995
The second stage in the history of the Russian stock market is characterized by the
final victory over inflation and a sharp decrease in the bounds of the currency corridor. It
should be noted that during the summer months in 1995 the dollar exchange rate
decreased till 4500 rouble per dollar  (almost by 10% in contrast to May) and the inflation
decreased till 2--3% per month.
Stage 3. August--December 1995
The third stage is completely determined by the bank crisis in August--September
1995 and the fact that investors were not confident in the results of the December
elections to the State Parliament (Duma). To a large extent, the bank crisis was caused by
low rates of interest in the State debt market, as well as by  inability of several
participants in the market to work  when rates of interest are low and the currency market
is stabilized. Some banks sold portfolios of GKO in order to maintain the current
liquidity, which resulted in large oscillations in rates of interest in the State debt market.
In the second half of this period, the lack of confidence of investors in the results of the
Parliament elections in 1995 was a destabilizing factor. It should be noted that the
absence of big players in the stock market resulted in extremely low daily trade volumes.
It should also be noted that till the beginning of 1997 the scales of the stock market were
significantly lower than the scales of the GKO--OFZ market.  For example, with respect
to such an important parameter as the daily trade volume, the stock market was more than
10 times smaller than the State debt market. It is not astonishing  that the influence of the
stock market on the economical life of the country at that time was insignificant.
Stage 4. January--June 1996
The fourth stage in the history of the Russian stock market is characterized by the
pre-election fever in 1996. One can observe efforts to maintain the rouble exchange rate
and to attract money resources necessary for successful per-election campaign. In April--
May the Central Bank of the Russian Federation sold more than 3 milliards dollars from
its currency reserves. These problems were solved successfully (the rouble exchange rate
varies only by 6% during the entire period, i.e., from 4700 roubles per dollar to 5000
roubles per dollar), which resulted in a sharp increase in rates of interest in the Russian
stock market. To the end of this period, the GKO rates grew up to the annual interest of
250—300%. At this stage, without any doubt, one had to take into account the
psychological factor that the majority of players were not sure in the further continuation
of reforms. It should also be noted that the response of the stock market to the pre-
election fever was different. Starting from March 1996, the plot of the RTS index shows
a stable-increasing trend.
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This stage is characterized by the President election, the end of the Chechen war,
and the credit rating given to Russia by the International agencies.  The further efforts to
maintain the rouble exchange rate and to decrease inflation, as well as to attain political
stabilization, resulted in a further decrease in rates of interest. In new issues one could see
obvious trends to increase their periods of life; for instance, year-term GKO and OFZ
with constant coupons appear. Russia received regular transfers of money from the
International Monetary Fund in due time. In the second half of this period, another
positive factor appeared: in November 1996 Russia obtained the credit rating BB+. To
the spring of 1997 the rouble rate of annual interest of GKO attained 15--18%, which
corresponds to 10--14% foreign exchange income. These rates of interest are comparable
with rates of interest provided by national bonds of other countries with the same credit
rating.  All premises for further growth of prices and bond indices at this economical
stage were exhausted.  Before Russia received the credit rating, the price dynamics in the
stock market was rather flaccid and the daily trade volumes rather low.  After Russia
received the credit rating, the share quotation in the stock market grew extremely fast till
the end of the period. On October 6, 1997, the RTS index attained the record-breaking
value of 571.66 points, the largest value during its entire history.  At this stage, a relative
increase in the RTS index was almost 500% during half a year.  It should be noted that in
this period the number of bonds passing the listing procedure in RTS and daily trade
volumes grew tremendously. To the summer in 1997, the scales of the State debt market
and the stock market became comparable. The dollar exchange rate varied weakly in the
entire period and attained the level of 5900 roubles per dollar to the end of the stage.  In
fact, the end of this stage coincides with ‘’Black Tuesday'' 28 October, when the RTS
index fell by 28%.
Stage 6. November 1997--March 1998
The world financial crisis attacked, to some extent, the markets in all countries
over the world. In a relatively short period of time, the bond indices fell by 10--15%,
while the RTS index dropped almost by one third. Attempts to stabilize the situation by
maintaining the rouble exchange rate and increasing the rates of interest had only a local
success and allowed a temporary stabilization in the State debt market at the beginning of
March.  To the beginning of March, the state of affairs in the stock market had also
changed somewhat to the best, but the RTS index did not even approach the pre-crisis
values.  It should be noted that, in spite of the unfavorable situation in the foreign and
Russian financial markets, the Government succeeded in maintaining the rouble
exchange rate with respect to dollar and, on January 1, even denominated the rouble one
thousand times. At the end of this stage, a political crisis struck Russia: the cabinet of
Victor Chernomyrdin was forced to resign. At the same time the confrontation among the
branches of the Government reinforced.  In the middle of March the rating agencies
decreased the credit rating of Russia.  The prices in the world oil market began to fall
violently, which decreased the income of the most of Russian oil companies and sharply
decreased the returns obtained in foreign trade.
8 Stage 7. April--August 1998
The seventh stage is the period of the next collapse in the stock market.  Efforts to
maintain the rouble exchange rate and an increase in the rate of interest did not lead to a
cardinal solution of  the problems that appeared at the previous stage. The currency
outflow from Russia got out of control and the pressure on the Central Bank grew
violently. An actual threat of the rouble devaluation makes investors to sell their GKO
portfolios in a hurry at dumping prices and to buy the currency for exportation. The
positive feedback circuit is thereby closed.  To the end of July the process got out of
control of the Government completely: there were no new GKO trading, the payments for
the old issues were covered directly from the budget, the rouble exchange rate was
maintained by selling gold and currency reserves of the Central Bank.  The oil crisis
significantly restricted the possibilities of the Central Bank somehow to enlarge its gold
and currency reserves by buying the currency from exporters.  As a result, the
Government defaulted on payments for GKO-OFZ during 1998--1999 years and declared
a 90-day moratorium on foreign debts  (this was an actual default); a large-scale rouble
devaluation occurred.  All this led to a system crisis in the entire country.  Although the
stock market continued to operate after August 17, the liquidity was lost to a large extent.
To the end of August the prices of the majority of bonds attained their minimum and the
daily trade volume decreased by several tens of times.
Tables 2-3 show some general characteristics of the internal State debt market
(Table 2) and the stock  (Table 3) during the period 1995-1998 within the framework of
the stages listed above.
Table 2.
Stage
number
Stage bounds
(duration in days)
Debt volume
to the end of
the stage
(billion denom.
Roubles)
Variation in
synthetic bond
price
Synthetic bond
rate of interest
(averaged over
the period)
1 January 1,1995-
May 31,1995
(150)
- 28.7% (for 90-
day bonds )
58.9% (for 180-
day bonds)
126.4% (for 90-
day bonds
122.% (for 180-
day bonds)
2 June 1, 1995-
July 31,1996
(61)
- -8.7% (for 90-
day bonds
-6.5% (for 180-
day bonds
55.8% (for 90-
day bonds)
68.7% (for 180-
day bonds)
3 August 1.1995- 76.7 0.4% (for 90- 94.0% (for 90-
9December 17,1995
(139)
day bonds)
-9.6% (for 180-
day bonds)
day bonds)
114.0% (for 180-
day bonds)
4 December 18,1995-
June 30, 1996
(195)
- 1.4% (for 90-
day bonds)
1.7% (for 180-
day bonds)
92.3% (for 90-
day bonds)
111.2% (for 180-
day bonds)
5 July 1, 1996-
October 31,1997
(489)
- 17.9% (for 90-
day bonds)
37.5% (for 180-
day bonds)
24.7% (for 270-
day bonds)
30.8% (for 90-
day bonds)
35.1% (for 180-
day bonds)
25.9% (for 270-
day bonds)
6 November 1,1997-
March 20, 1998
(140)
415.7 -0.9% (for 90-
day bonds)
-3.2% (for 180-
day bonds)
-5.8% (for 270-
day bonds)
21.6% (for 90-
day bonds)
29.5% (for 180-
day bonds)
30.5% (for 270-
day bonds)
7 March 21, 1998-
August 14,1998
(146)
387.1 -24.6% (for 90-
day bonds)
-36.6% (for 180-
day bonds)
-44.7% (for 270-
day bonds)
50.2% (for 90-
day bonds)
53.5% (for 180-
day bonds)
52.5% (for 270-
day bonds)
Table 3.
Stage
number
Stage bounds
(duration  in
days)
Stock market
capitalization at
the beginning of
the stage
RTS index
variation.
Stage-averaged
day trading
volume in the
RTS system
3 September 1,
995
18.0 mill. Doll. -17.6% 2.37 mill. Doll.
10
December
7,1995
 (108)
4 December
8,1995
June 30, 1996
(195)
14.8 mill. Doll. 151.9% 8.77 mill. Doll.
5 July 1, 1996
October 31,
1997
(489)
37.2 mill. Doll. 106.8% 40.01 mill. Doll.
6 November
1,1997
March 20, 1998
 (140)
76.6 mill. Doll. -20.5% 67.08 mill. Doll.
7 March 21, 1998
August 14, 1998
 (146)
60.9 mill. Doll. -65.7% 45.83 mill. Doll.
On August 14, 1998 the stock market capitalization was 20.9 mill. Doll.
How can one explain the five-times increase in the price of the Russian stocks,
while the general macroeconomics factors in Russia demonstrate at most only a tendency
for a decrease in the rate of recession?
Even a cursory examination of Fig. 1 shows that there exists a high correlation
between the dynamics of gold and currency reserves of the Central Bank and the
dynamics of the RTS index in the period of its growth from the end of 1996 till its fall
after October 27, 1997. The correlation between the gold and currency reserves of the
Central Bank and the RTS index, calculated over the period from January 31, 1996, to
August 31, 1998, was 0.74 and the correlation calculated over the period from December
31, 1996, to August 31, 1998, was even larger, 0.86.
The RTS index in this period increased approximately by a factor of five and than
fell somewhat lower than its initial level. Therefore, we can assume that the volume of
money resources attracted to the Russian stock market in this period was significantly
larger than that attracted in 1995 and at the beginning of 1996. Unfortunately, we do not
have a possibility to receive any information on this volume. Since the stock market
participants themselves did not have such information, we can assume that the data on the
gold and currency reserves of the Central Bank given in mass media can be a reference
point common to everybody, especially under the conditions of comparatively slowly
varying fundamental money factors (Figs. 2 and 3 in Appendix 1).
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Generally speaking, in the period from 1995 to the present time (which is not a
good time for the Russian stock market), one can observe the following two stable
characteristic features. The first is that the majority of the market participants believe that
the stocks of many Russian companies are underestimated. Different agencies and broker
companies gave different estimates, but most of them confirm the fact that the prices of
Russian stocks are significantly lower than the prices of western analogs. As is known,
the common expectation of the market participants necessarily manifests itself in some
way.  The second characteristic feature of Russian stocks is that the dividends of ordinary
stocks are extremely low if paid at all. To our knowledge, if for the stock price we take
the stock price on September 1, 1998, and for the dividends we take the dividend
magnitude in 1997, then the ratio D/P is approximately equal to 0.04 (this corresponds to
the data given in the journal «Expert»). If we compare the 4-percent (with respect to the
low price of the stock) annual dividends with the existing refunding rate approximately
equal to the annual interest of 20--40%, then we can see that the purchase of stocks of
Russian companies by nonstrategic investors is in character a game intended to increase
the stock price. (The functioning of the futures market of the most liquid Russian stocks
allowed additional speculative games.)
Just this second «peculiar» feature of the Russian stock market denudes the stock
course price of some natural lower bound.  The price can fall to a very low level.  Besides
of this, this fact practically annihilates any correlation between the stock course price and
the actual situation in the corresponding industry branch.
However, here we must stress the following fact. If a company in the Russian
stock market becomes attractive to foreign investors, then the market reacts to this fact
immediately.
 So, we can hypothesize that the Russian stock market is very attractive to foreign
investors from the viewpoint of games intended to increase the stock price.
The infrastructure of the Russian stock market is well organized (more exactly,
the infrastructure can readily be reconstructed if money resources are available) but  ... so
far the risks of operations in Russia are very high. If the risk decreases  (provided that the
problem of the debt reconstruction is solved, the foreign stabilization loans are given, and
political stability is attained), then the stock market can regain its former liquidity in a
very short period of time.
Although there are such striking peculiar features, the Russian stock market is not
completely isolated, first of all, because of foreign investors.
As we can see in Fig. 1, these time-series have brightly expressed trends and,
according to the information in Table 3, these trends are highly correlated in several
pairs.  It is natural to study the problem of cointegration of these time series. But a
statistical analysis of  time series of first differences of the variables under study (see Fig.
2) allows us to conclude that these series are nonstationary. Therefore, we cannot say that
these series are cointegrated, at least, in the classical sense.
Is the time dependence between the stock index, the gold and currency reserves,
and the state bond prices a special characteristic feature of the Russian financial market?
Studying the dynamics of stock markets in different countries during the last three years,
we see that not only in the Russian market one could observe a five-times increase in the
stock index followed by its drop to the original level. During 1996-98 the Venezuelan
stock market varied in a similar way, and moreover, these changes were accompanied by
variations in the gold and currency reserves just as it happened in Russian.
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Table 4. Correlation matrix
RTS GKPR_180 GKPR_90 GCR_4
RTS  1.000000  0.802665  0.730466  0.733617
GKPR_180  0.802665  1.000000  0.972752  0.429397
GKPR_90  0.730466  0.972752  1.000000  0.407460
GCR_4  0.733617  0.429397  0.407460  1.000000
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Fig. 1 Time dependence of  the RTS, GKPR_180, GKPR_90, GCR_4 series
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Fig. 2 Time dependence of differences
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An analogy with the Russian stock market can be observed for the following time
series of  the Venezuelan market:
IBC-stock index, Reseves$ - international reserves in mill. Doll., ResevesBs -
international reserves in bolivars, BP_30, BP_60, BP_90 - the prices of synthetic state
bonds with nominal value of 100 and with 30-, 60-, 90-day periods of payment. The time
dependence of the series IBC and Reserves$, BP_30 and BP_60 and BP_90, DReserves$
and  DReservesBs during 2.5 years from January 2, 1997, to August 5, 1999, is shown in
Fig. 3. One can readily see that these series have distinct trends and the correlation
between IBC and ReservesBs is very large.  If we neglect details, then we see that the
dynamics of time series has much in common for Russia and Venezuela  (Figs. 1 and 3).
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Fig. 3  Dynamics of the finanacial market in Venezuela
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2. Arbitrage and quasi-arbitrage operations in the cash  and futures markets
Futures contracts in the stock market
Securities are financial tools based on real assets. Financial derivatives are financial
tools based on other simpler financial tools. It is commonly agreed to classify forward and
futures contracts, options, financial futures and financial futures options as financial
derivatives. In turn, financial futures as divided into currency futures, interest futures (for
promissory notes), and swaps and futures for stock market indices.
When the financial derivatives are bought, they impose certain obligations on the
seller and the buyer concerning a fixed time instant in the future (or until a fixed time
instant in the future) and the tools that underlie the financial derivatives. Transactions of
such type are called forward transactions (transactions for a term) in contrast to
transactions in the cash market (cash or spot transactions) with immediate payment and
delivery. A classical example of spot transactions is buying (selling) of a forward
contracts.
A forward contract is an agreement between two parties one of which commits
oneself to buy and the other party commits oneself to sell a certain amount of goods or
securities at a specified price at a future time instant fixed in the agreement (on the day at
which the contract is executed). In this case neither money nor goods are required till the
time indicated in the contract. Since there are no standards for terms and amounts of
goods, forward contracts are used only out of stock markets.
{Strictly speaking, according to this definition, goods forwards and futures cannot
be classified as financial derivatives, since they are based on actual goods but not on
financial tools. However, in the literature, this specific characteristic of goods forwards
(futures) is not taken into account when possible combinations of financial derivatives and
real assets are analyzed.}
Futures contracts are traded in stock markets. A difference between futures and
forward contracts is that the delivery amount of certain goods is fixed in the futures
contract (both in nomenclature and in quality) and  futures contracts must be executed in
certain fixed months of the year. In this case, the stock market guarantees that the contract
will be executed and, in this sense, it is absolutely unimportant for the buyer (seller) who,
in fact, executes the contract (i.e., who delivers the goods or securities and who pays for
the delivery). In the stock market jargon, to buy a futures contract means to take a long
position (to go long) and to sell a futures contract means to take a short position (to go
short). If a participant of the futures market simultaneously goes long and short in the
same futures contract, it is said that the position of this participant in this futures contract
is closed.
To fulfill the obligations assumed, the stock market obliges both the seller and the
buyer of futures to deposit some money resources (the initial margin) in the Settlement
House of the market. This initial margin will be returned when the contract is executed or
the position is closed. The quantity of the initial margin depends on the concrete assets
and is determined by the market with account of the volatility of the price of the assets.
In the Russian market the quantity of the initial margin is usually equal to 5% of the
price of the contract. In some markets it is allowed to deposit up to 70% of the initial
margin in liquid securities indicated in advance.
Besides of the initial margin deposited before a position is taken, the market obliges
all participants with open positions to deposit some additional money to compensate the
negative (from the viewpoint of those in open positions) daily variation of the price of the
contract, i.e., the so-called negative variation margin. For this purpose, every day the
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calculated (settlement) price is announced in the market. This price is calculated over the
results of the daily auction (often, it is simply the closure price, i.e., the price during the
last minutes of the auction). Then the daily variation in the calculated price (the settlement
change) is announced as the difference between the calculated prices of the current and
preceding days. On the basis of these data, the Settlement House of the market reestimates
positions of the participants, i.e., performs marking them to the market.
If, in this case, it turns out that the settlement change of the contract is positive,
there are the following consequences:
• the variation margin is positive for those who go long in this contract (the sum equal
to the settlement change will be paid into his current account);
• the variation margin is negative for those who go short in this contract (the sum equal
to the settlement change will be taken from his current account). If the settlement
change of the contract turns out to be negative, then the situation is opposite: those
who go long «lose», while those who go short «win». Thus the absolute value of the
variation margin is equal to the absolute value of the variation in the current account
corresponding to the open position, while these variations are of opposite signs for the
long and short positions.
The money in the current accounts of the contract buyers and sellers in the
Settlement House in the form of the initial margin provide the possibility for the market to
cover losses of both parties on any day if the prices volatility is unfavorable (the variation
margin is negative). At the end of each trading day (before the next trading day starts),
both the buyer and the seller must guarantee that their current accounts in the Settlement
House contain money not less than a certain sum. This sum is called the maintenance
margin. As, because of a negative daily variation margin, the sum of money in the current
account decreases till the value of the maintenance margin (or becomes less than this
value), the seller (buyer) of the contract must add to his current account  the amount of the
initial margin. If this requirement is violated, the Exchange on its own may close this
unprovided position at the beginning of the next trading day.
Basic parameters that provide a gain in arbitrage transactions
Arbitrage transaction is a set of operations in the market that bring an income
because of the difference in prices existing at the moment in one or several markets.
Arbitrage transactions without use of the ownership initial capital are often called pure
arbitrage. Under certain conditions an arbitrage transaction can turn into pure arbitrage.
As an example, we consider the situation in the spot market of securities and in the
market of borrowed capital. If only the tools of these markets are used, then the income
obtained by sale and purchase operations depends on the future price of the assets. Since
arbitrators do not know the future dynamics of prices, one can speak about each arbitrage
transaction with some probability (if we mean the future) or as of a lost possibility (if we
mean the past). Hence we can treat each transaction not as an arbitrage but as a
speculative transaction.
A more definite situation arises if there exists both cash and forward (futures)
markets for a certain type of goods. To analyze a typical situation in the cash, futures, and
money markets, we need the following notation. For the unit of goods we take 100 stocks
of a company whose dealer sale and purchase prices at the initial time t are equal to Pa(t)
and Pb(t), respectively, (Pa(t)>Pb(t)) and whose corresponding prices of execution of
futures contracts (at time T ) are
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FaT(t) (for the buyer of the contract) and
FbT(t) (for the seller of the contract)  (FaT(t) ≥  FbT(t)).
We assume that the annual borrowing rate possible for the arbitrator is rbor(t)  and
the possible lending rate is rlen(t).  Moreover, we assume that
  a) the transaction costs for buying 100 stocks of a company are equal to the fraction rtr of
the purchase price;
  b) the loan of 100 stocks of a company  for the term (T-t)  is equal to the fraction loanρ  of
the sale price at the time of signing the loan contract;
  c) the initial margin in the futures market is equal to the fraction rm of the contract price.
By using the above notation, one can easily analyze the payment flows arising in
arbitrage transactions of two types (the direct and reverse cash-and-carry strategies).
Description of the direct arbitrage operation (cash-and-carry strategy)
At the current time t
1) To take the credit B=Pa(t)*(1+rtr)+FbT(t)* rm for the period T-t at the 100*rbor(t)
annual rate.
2) To buy 100 stock of a company in the cash market at the price Pa(t) and to pay
the transaction costs Pa(t)* rtr..
3) To sell the futures contract (going short) for delivery of 100 stocks of the
company after the time interval T-t at the price FbT(t) and to deposit the initial margin
FbT(t)* rm
At time T  of  the contract execution
1) To deliver 100 stocks of the company according to the futures contract. To
receive, according to the contract, the sum of money FbT(t) and the initial margin FbT(t)*
rm.
2)  To return the sum of the money loan which together with the interest is
[Pa(t)*(1+rtr)+ FbT(t)* rm ]*(1+rbor(t)*(T-t)).
The gain received during the time interval T-t is equal to
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The condition 01 >Π  can be written in the form
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and  the symbol ),( tTtUBpa −  stands for the Upper Bound for pure arbitrage
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Description of the reverse arbitrage operation  (reverse cash-and-carry strategy)
At the current time t
       1)  To loan 100 stocks of a company for the period T-t.
2) To sell 100 stocks of the company  in the cash market at the price Pb(t)  and to pay
the  transaction costs Pb(t)* rtr.
       3) To buy a futures contract  (to go long) for delivery of  100 stocks of the company
after the time interval  T-t at the price FaT(t) and to deposit the initial margin FaT(t)* rm in
the Settlement House of the market.
       4) To deposit the remaining sum of money L(t)= Pb(t)*(1-rtr)- FaT(t)* rm for the time
interval  T-t  at the rate of 100* rlen(t)  annual return.
{It is assumed that L(t)>0,  which, in turn, bounds the value FaT(t):
FaT(t)<Pb(t)*(1-rtr)/rm.  Since the variables rm and rtr  are small  (rm<0.1 and rtr<0.1), this
inequality holds practically always.}
At time T  of the contract execution
       1) To receive the sum  [Pb(t)*(1-rtr) - FaT(t)* rm](1+rlen(t)*(T-t))  of money deposited.
       2) To receive  the delivered 100 stocks of the company according to the futures
contract and, according to the contract, to pay the sum of money FbT(t) and to receive the
initial margin FbT(t)* rm.
       3)  To return 100 stocks and to pay the sum  Pb(t)* loanρ   for the money loan.
{In transaction 2, the combination of operations 1) and 2) at time t  and  operation
3) at time T is called the short sale or the sale without settlement. This concerns any
possible assets, not only god. However, such an operation is not always possible because
of various reasons.}
The gain received during the time interval T-t  is equal to
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The condition 02 >Π  can be written in the form
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Here, by analogy with (2.3) and (2.4), we use the following  notation: ),( tTtra −′  stands
for the reverse arbitrage interest rate and ),( tTtLBpa −  for the Lower Bound of  pure
arbitrage.
        Let us note the following characteristic features of arbitrage strategies:
      1. The cash-and-carry strategies considered do not use the initial ownership capital.
Hence the usual notion of gain cannot be used for characterizing such cash-and-carry
strategies. However, the norms of income of the direct and reverse arbitrage operations
defined by relations (2.3) and (2.6) characterize the relation between the futures and spot
markets under existing loan and deposit rates.
      2. It is unprofitable to carry out the direct and reverse cash-and-carry strategies
simultaneously, since we have
021 <Π+Π ,
in view of the inequalities FaT(t)-FbT(t)>0,  Pa(t)-Pb(t)>0,  rbor-rlen>0.
      3. The assumption that it is impossible to realized a pure arbitrage transaction  implies
the following natural two-sided bounds on the prices of futures contracts:
))(*)(1(*)()()())(*)(1(*)( tUBpatTtPtFtFtLBpatTtP abTaTb −+<≈<−+   (2.7)
      4. If we neglect the spread between the purchase and sell prices, then we have
),(),( tTtrtTtr aa −≈−′ . In this case the two-sided inequality (2.7) turns into the following
two-sided inequality for the norm of  income of the arbitrage operation: the direct and
reverse cash-and-carry strategies of pure arbitrage carried out at time  t  during the period
T-t  are unprofitable if
),(),(),( tTtUBpatTtrtTtLBpa a −<−<−         (2.8)
In other words,  a situation, which theoretically  is arbitrageless, can exist only if
inequality  (2.8) is satisfied.
Synthetic bond and quasi-arbitrage
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In the preceding section we studied the situation in which it was possible to realize
the pure arbitrage. However, if the ownership capital exists, a transaction of cash-and-
carry type can be regarded as an alternative to riskless investments in Treasury bills.
Under certain conditions, this alternative transaction is more profitable than investment in
the state security bonds. A realization of this possibility is called quasi-arbitrage.
Let us study this possibility in more detail. We assume that an investor does not
want to loan money and is ready to spend the sum B=Pa(t)* (1+rtr)+FbT(t)* rm of his own
money in order to realize a direct arbitrage transaction. Then the following two operations
are excluded from the cash-and-carry strategy: one need not loan money and return this
money with interest .
We see that, for the operation under study, the payment flow is equivalent to the
payment flow in the case of purchasing a discount couponless bond and possessing this
bond till its repayment. Such a bond, which does not exist  in  nature, is called a synthetic
bond. In other words, a synthetic bond is a set of operations with financial tools  whose
payment flow is equivalent to the payment flow of a couponless bond. One can define a
synthetic bond by the following symbolic relation:
Synthetic   T-bill = Spot-Futures
For the initial costs of size B(t), the profit obtained by the investor is equal to
]1[*)()(1 trabT rtPtF +−=Π ,
and the income of this transaction (in other words, the lending rate on the synthetic bond
market calculated by the simplest interest formula with one-year time base) is equal to
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        Suppose that, at the same time, the lending rate on the GKO market with the
payment period T-t is equal to lenr~ (t,T-t).  Then, by definition, the condition
              ),(~),(~ tTtrtTtr len −>−                                                              (2.10)
is a condition under which the  quasi-arbitrage is possible for this investor. In this case,
the price of the futures contract FbT(t) must satisfy the inequality
)](*)(~*)(*)(~1[*)())(*~*1(*)( tTtrrtTtrrtPtTrrtF lentrlentralenmbT −+−++>−− .
By analogy with ),( tTtUBpa − , we define the upper bound of the quasi-arbitrage
operation as follows:
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Then we can easily rewrite (2.9) as
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Hence the quasi-arbitrage realization condition (2.10)  acquires the form
             ),(),( tTtUbqatTtra −>− .                                                              (2.13)
If we compare the opposite inequality, which means that the quasi-arbitrage is
impossible, with the inequality 01 <Π , which means that the pure arbitrage is impossible,
then we can easily see that the only difference between them is that  borr  is replaced by
lenr
~
. If lenbor rr ~>  , then ),( tTtUbqa − > ),( tTtUBpa − . However, for a more realistic
condition 1
~
10 <<−<
bor
len
r
r
, the following inequality is satisfied:
),( tTtUbqa − < ),( tTtUBpa − , i.e., the condition that the pure arbitrage is impossible is
more rigid than that for the quasi-arbitrage. This means that even if the pure arbitrage is
impossible in the market (for investors who do not have their own capital), a realization of
quasi-arbitrage is possible for investors who have their own initial capital. Recall that the
initial finance state (the bench mark) of an investor realizing the quasi-arbitrage is
different than that of an investor realizing the pure arbitrage.
Reverse quasi-arbitrage
Assume that an investor possesses 100 stocks of  a company (there exist futures
contracts for these stocks) and a sum of money trbmaT rtPrtFtB *)(*)()( += .  He sells
100 stocks at the price )(tP b , pays the transaction costs trb rtP *)( , and buys a futures
contract for 100 stocks of this company with payment period  T . For this futures contract
he pays the initial margin m
a
T rtF *)( . Then the investor deposits the money obtained for
the stocks at the rate of 100* rlen(t) annual return and thus receives the sum
Pb(t)*(1+rlen(t)*(T-t))   on the day of the contract execution. He pays the price of the
contract )(tF aT  from the money obtained and gets the 100 stocks back.
As the result of these operations, the investor has the same 100 stocks plus the
money profit
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The rate of return of the above operation can be calculated as the ratio of the profit  (2.14)
to the cash expenditures divided by the time interval between the beginning and the end of
the operation:
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By analogy with (2.10), the following inequality is a condition that a quasi-arbitrage
realization does not lead to losses for the investor:
),(~),(ˆ tTtrtTtr len −>− .           (2.16)
By using  notation (2.6) and taking into account (2.15), we can rewrite condition (2.16) in
the form
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If the spread between the purchase and sell prices is neglected, then we have
),(),( tTtrtTtr aa −≈−′ . In this case the condition that both the direct and the reverse
quasi-arbitrage is impossible can be written in terms of a two-sided inequality for the
norm of income of the arbitrage operation as follows:
),(),(),( tTtUbqatTtrtTtLbqa a −<−<−               (2.18)
For some natural relations between the existing rates of return, inequality (2.18) implies
inequality (2.8). But inequality (2.8) does not necessarily implies (2.18).
Norm of income of arbitrage operations as an indicator of arbitrage possibilities
It follows from the above theoretical arguments that one can estimate the possibility
of  an arbitrage strategy by comparing the norm of  income of the arbitrage operation
),( tTtra −  with the bounds  ),( tTtUBpa − , ),( tTtUbqa − , ),( tTtLbqa − ,
),( tTtLBpa − .  Let us consider the case most frequently encountered in practice, i.e., the
case  of embedded  inequalities
),( tTtLBpa − < ),( tTtLbqa − < ),( tTtUbqa − < ),( tTtUBpa −
for each t and T-t. All possible arbitrage realizations are summarized in Table Z, which is
rather simple.
Table Z
Relation Profitable strategy
UBpara > Both the pure direct arbitrage and the direct quasi-
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arbitrage are possible.
UBparUbqa a << The rate of return of the direct quasi-arbitrage is larger
than  that of the GKO repayment with the same
duration period
UbqarLbqa a << Neither of the above strategies is profitable
LbqarLBpa a << The rate of return of the reverse quasi-arbitrage is
larger than that of the GKO repayment with the same
duration period
LBpara < Both the pure reverse arbitrage and the reverse quasi-
arbitrage are possible
Risks in arbitrage operations
In the arbitrage operations studied above, there are no risks related to future price
variations in the market. In this sense, such operations are riskless. However, investors
who use the market financial tools depend on whether the stock market fulfills its
obligations. In the second half of the 90ies the young Russian market acted under very
complicated political and economical conditions. In August 1998, the GKO market, the
most reliable market during the last 5 years, crashed down.   Previously, in May 1998, the
largest futures market in the Russian stock market collapsed. The cause was very simple:
the stock market did not fulfill its obligations to preserve the initial and the variation
margin but used this margin for its own game in the futures and other markets via
«friendly» broker offices. Therefore, when in May 1998 it was necessary to close a lot of
positions, the market could not fulfill its obligations. An attempt to solve this situation in
legal form was not successful. The courts treated the futures contracts as bets and refused
to consider the actions. And this was not the first time in the short Russian history of
futures auctions. Hence, due to this cause, the Russian futures market in the 90ies was
very speculative, although, as we show later, there were good possibilities for quasi-
arbitrage operations.
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3. Analysis of  possibilities of arbirage operations by the example of  stockes   of
«Lukoil» (LKOH) and RAO EES (EESR) companies
Many theories describing financial markets are based on an essential  assumption
that arbitrage operations in these markets are impossible. It is assumed that a market
operates so that the information circulating within this market does not allow the same
arbitrage possibilities to exist for a long time. In this section we show how far the
situation in the Russian stock market was from this idyllic picture.
 As the main object of our study, we consider the quasi-arbitrage transactions
between the futures market and the spot market of stocks of Russian companies during
the period from November 1996 to May 1998. Separately, we consider the possibility of
pure arbitrage between these markets.
 Choice of stock exchange, securities, and the time interval
 During the last three years the largest trade volume of securities of Russian
companies was observed outside the stock exchange market in the electronic trade system
"Russian trade system" (RTS). In contrast to stock exchanges dealing with securities of at
most 10-15 companies and having the daily trade volume of at most 5-7 million dollars,
the RTS listing contains more than 200 securities, including practically the most liquid
stocks (the so-called "blue chips"). In this case the average daily trade volume in the
system exceed 20 million dollars. The number of operators (players carrying out
transactions) in the RTS is considerably greater than the number of players in all Russian
stock exchanges. Thus the dynamics of prices in the RTS is less affected by the
momentary mood of a player or of a group of players. It should be noted that the RTS
index is, de-facto, one of the most important indices of the financial activity of the
country and a special mirror of the Russian stock market for Western investors, in
contrast to the stock exchange indices that are known to a small number of specialists.
Thus it is reasonable to take just the results of the RTS-trades as the input data for spot-
transactions in our further analysis.
We consider the Russian exchange (RE) as the stock exchange, which provides us
with data in the future market operations. First of all, this choice is stimulated by the
following facts: a relatively narrow specialization of the exchange which, almost without
exceptions, trades with futures for securities of Russian companies, a high daily trade
volume of these transactions exceeding a similar index of other exchanges, and a large
number of operators in this market. The final data for transactions in the Russian
exchange were conducted on the fifteenth of each month. Types of futures contracts and
the annual trade volumes related to these contracts in the Russian stock market are shown
in Appendix 2.
         We choose an object of  analysis, i.e., the securities of concrete companies, so that
they satisfy, at least, the following two assumptions: they must be highly liquid (i.e., their
daily trade volume in these securities must be standardly high) and they must have a long
market history. We believe that ordinary stocks of RAO EES and NK LUKOIL satisfy
these assumptions most completely. Both these companies enter the first dozen of the
largest Russian companies and the daily trade volume of their securities is comparable
with the entire daily trade volume in the RTS system. The securities of these emitters
were traded in the RTS system since the advent of the system of electronic trades in
Russia and thus possess the largest market history.
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It is necessary to take into account the fact that, in view of some reasons such as
problems with reregistration of stocks in the RTS system, with money transfer, etc.,
futures transactions in the direct arbitrage are most frequently concluded for the next
month. Hence, on each current day,  we consider the possibility to use futures contracts
with payment periods from 45 to 15 days.
The time series for the norm of income of an arbitrage operation ),( tTtra − , the
upper bound for the pure arbitrage ),( tTtUBpa − , and the upper bound for the  quasi-
arbitrage ),( tTtUbqa −  are constructed as follows. We choose a contract with payment
period Ti . For all time instants  t such that  the variable Ti-t lies in the interval from   45 to
15 days, we calculate the values of  ),( tTtra − , ),( tTtUBpa − , ),( tTtUbqa −  by formulas
(2.3), (2.4), and (2.6). Then we consider the contract for the next month with payment
period Ti+1 and, again for all times t such that  Ti+1-t  lies in the interval from   45 to 15
days, calculate the values of ),( tTtra − , ),( tTtUBpa − , ),( tTtUbqa − . In a similar way,
by formulas  (2.6) and (2.17), we construct the time series for the lower  bounds. Thus we
obtain long time series in which we take into account the prices of all contracts with
payment periods are separated from the current time instant t by 15-45 days. We shall say
that  such series are series for one month contracts.
Finally, we choose a time interval for our analysis taking into account the process
of formation of the Russian future corporate securities market. So, the future market of
NK LUKOIL securities became highly liquid in November 1996, while the future market
of RAO EES securities only in May 1997. Thus the series used for further analysis  start
from November 1, 1996, for NK LUKOIL and from May 7, 1997, for RAO EES. Both
time series end on May 25, 1998. On this day the Russian stock market ceased to operate
with futures contracts.
Possibilities of  practical realization for different arbitrage operations
As was already shown in Section 2, the pure arbitrage operations are profitable if
the two-sided inequality (2.8) is not satisfied. Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix 3 illustrate the
time series for norms of income ),( tTtra −  and the upper  (UBpa) and lower (LBpa)
bounds of pure arbitrage operations with  LKOH and  EESR stocks. The possibilities of
direct quasi-arbitrage operations with the same stocks are shown in Figs. 3 and 4 in
Appendix 3.
We calculated the upper and lower bounds by using the following values of
parameters that are typical of the Russian stock market during this period:
,0025.0≈trr     ,05.0≈mr     )(*)( tTtrlenloan −≈ρ .
We also used  the MIBOR-30 and MIBID-30 rates as borr  and rlen and the rate of return
for GKO bonds as lenr~  .
A qualitative analysis of arbitrage possibilities for the entire time period under study
is shown in Table 5. In addition to the possibilities provided by  LKOH or EESR stocks,
this table shows a more profitable strategy when, among two types of stocks, one can
choose the most profitable on the current day (see the results in the last column).
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Table 5.  Some parameters of arbitrage operations
NK LUKOIL RAO EES NK LUKOIL and
RAO EES jointly
Direct
arbitrage
Direct
arbitrage
Direct
arbitrage
Number of observations 383 253 253
Number of observations for which
the pure arbitrage is realized
UBpara >  [the number of
observations in %]
168
[44%]
142
[56%]
161
 [64%]
Number of observations for which
the direct quasi-arbitrage is
realized  Ubqara >  [the number
of observations in %]
241
[63%]
177
 [70%]
203
[80%]
Average rate of return r~  of all
direct quasi-arbitrage operations
over the period (annual return in
% )
30.5% 29.9% 33.2%
Average rate of return [standard
deviation] r~ of the direct quasi-
arbitrage  when its rate of return
exceeds that of  GKO bonds
(annual return in %)
42.5%
[24.8%]
38.9%
[22.3%]
41.4%
[26.1%]
Maximal [minimal] rate of return
r~ of the direct quasi-arbitrage
when its rate  of return exceeds
that of GKO bonds  (annual return
in %)
333%
[15.8%]
274%
[14.7%]
333%
[14.7%]
Average rate of return of GKO
bonds [standard deviation]  over
the period* (annual return in %)
24.0%
[9.6%]
22.1%
[10.6%]
22.1%
[10.6%]
Maximal [minimal] rate of return
of GKO bonds over the period*
(annual return in  %)
104.2%
[7.5%]
104.2%
[9.5%]
104.2%
[9.5%]
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Average rate of return of
MIBOR-30 [MIBID-30] over the
period (annual return in %)
32.4%
[21%]
29.8%
[18%]
29.8%
[18%]
Reverse
 arbitrage
Reverse
 arbitrage
Reverse
arbitrage
Number of observations for which
the reverse pure arbitrage is
realized LBpara <  [the number of
observations in %]
24
[6%]
12
[5%]
30
 [12%]
Number of observations for which
the reverse quasi-arbitrage is
realized LBqara <  [the number of
observations in %]
78
[20%]
34
[13%]
72
[28%]
*- bonds with the same period of payment   
One can easily see that the theoretical possibility of pure arbitrage during the time
period in question was rather large: 44% of operations with NK LUKOIL stocks, 56% of
operations with RAO EES stocks, and 64% of operations when the most profitable stocks
were chosen. The theoretical possibility for reverse pure arbitrage was rather seldom.
Moreover, it should be noted that, in practice, these operations in their classical form can
hardly be realized in the Russian stock market, since during one day it is impossible  to
receive the money for the sold stocks, to buy a contract, and to deposit the rest of money.
Hence the lower bound  LBpa  is of a rather theoretical interest. As for direct and reverse
quasi-arbitrage operations, in practice they were realized  by some broker firms and
realized successfully.
This fact is not surprising, since the number of observations in which  the rate of
return of direct arbitrage exceeded that of GKO bonds with the same period of payment
varied, depending on the type of operation,  from 63% to 80% of the total number of
observations. In this case the average rate of return  of these operations was
approximately two times greater than the rate of return obtained from operations with
GKO bonds.
However, the most of the above possibilities were realized in the market during the
5th and 6th periods (see the classification given in Section 1). Table 6 shows the number
of cases (in % of the total number of observations during the corresponding stage) in
which it was possible to realize some arbitrage strategy (according to Table 5) while
working with NK LUKOIL stocks. Table 7 shows the same data for RAO EES stocks.
Table  6
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LKOH UBpara > Ubqara > LBqara < LBpara < Pure
arbitrage is
unprofitable
Quasi-
arbitrage is
not
effective
5 stage 46% 52% 25% 9% 45% 13%
6 stage 50% 76% 11% 2% 48% 13%
7 stage 16% 34% 18% 3% 81% 48%
Over all
stages
44% 63% 20% 6% 50% 31%
Table 7
EESR UBpara > Ubqara > LBqara < LBpara < Pure
arbitrage is
unprofitable
Quasi-
arbitrage is
not
effective
5 stage 65% 76% 14% 7% 25% 10%
6 stage 60% 75% 9% 2% 38% 16%
7 stage 18% 39% 24% 5% 77% 37%
Over all
stages
56% 70% 13% 5% 39% 17%
By comparing the data for the stages given in the tables,  one can see that the
behavior of  the market participants at the 7th stage is principally different from that at the
preceding two stages. Namely, the possibility to realize effective arbitrage strategies has
sharply decreased. In fact, already the two months before the futures markets collapsed
and hence the four month before the default, the situation in the futures market with  the
two most liquid stocks illustrated the fears of participants concerning the future of the
stock market.
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Time structure of  the norm of  income for direct arbitrage operations
Usually, theorists consider increases in the rate of  payment return with period of
payment  as a normal but not necessary phenomenon in the bond market. What situation
was in the GKO market during the period from November 1996 to May 1998 and what
can be said about the dependence of  the norm of ),( tTtra − and the rate of return of
direct arbitrage operations ),(~ tTtr − on the duration of futures contracts T-t in this period
of time?
Let us formulate the basic hypothesis, which must be either supported or rejected by
statistical data: if the period of operation )(*365 tTn −=  increases, then the rate of
return of GKO payment ),(~ tTtrlen − ,  the norm of income ),( tTtra − , and the rate of
return of  direct arbitrage ),(~ tTtr −  increase.
Analyzing statistical data, we arrive at the following results. For the norm of
income with payment period n, for ]120,6[∈n  days, the above hypothesis holds. The
linear regression obtained by the method of least squares implies the following relations
(the values of standard deviationis for the regression coefficients are given in
parentheses):
for NK LUKOIL stocks
ra=0.2486+0.0024*n,
(0.225)  (0.0004)                    R2=0.03,
(0.226)  
for RAO EES stocks
ra=0.206+0.0036*n,
     (0.046)  (0.0010)                    R2=0.02.
However, if  n  varies from 15 to 45 days, then there is  no  statistically significant
dependence between the above  variables and the contract duration n. These facts can be
interpreted as follows. Participants of the futures market considered significant increases
in the period from the beginning to the end of arbitrage operations as increasing risks.
But they did not consider any changes in the contract duration within  15-45 days as
increasing risks. Hence all contracts with duration in this interval can be analyzed
uniformly as an analog of  some averaged  contract with one-month duration (30 days).
Remark: the fact that there are no 1-5-day operations in the regression can be
explained by the physical impossibility to perform such operations, since a new
registration and transmission of stocks in the RTS system requires four trading days and
an operator, after the purchase of a stock share, technically cannot  deliver the share due
to the futures contract.
Statistical analysis of  relations between the futures and the spot market
(The futures price of  stocks as an estimate of the future spot price of stocks)
In an analysis of the futures market of any assets, we arrive at the following natural
question: to what extent can the futures prices, at least  on the average, estimate the
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future price of an asset? In the present paper we restrict our study to the prices of the NK
LUKOIL and RAO EES stocks that were most liquid in the Russian market from
November 1996 to May 1998.
For a variable characterizing the proximity between the futures price and the future
spot price of stocks, we take the difference of rates of return
tsttat nrnrnRD )()()( −= ,                                                                  (3.1)
where
ntP
tPtF
nr ntta
365
)(
)()()( ∗−= + ,        
ntP
tPntP
nr tst
365
)(
)()()( ∗−+= .    (3.2)
In (3.1), (3.2) the number n is the duration of a contract in days, P(t) is the spot price on
the day t without taking account of the spread between the purchase and sell prices, and
Ft+n(t)  is the futures price of the contract with payment period of  n days on the day  t.
Thus tnRD )(  is the difference between the norm of income of the arbirage operation and
the rate of return of  the purchase and sell operation with stocks with time interval of  n
days. In other words, tnRD )(  is the difference between the expected
(from the viewpoint of the futures market) and the realized rate of return  of the purchase
and sell operation with stocks.
We assume that tnRD )(  is a realization at time t of the random variable
)()()( nrnrnRD sta −= .  Then it is natural to expect that if, on the average, the future
prices is correctly guessed by the futures  market, then the mathematical expectation
)}({ nRDE  must be equal to zero.
A statistical verification of this hypothesis is based on calculating the sampling
average for each  n:
)()()()(
1)( nrnrnRD
nN
nRD st
t
at −=∗= ∑ .
The statistical hypothesis 0)}({ =nRDE  for each n was verified for NK LUKOIL and
RAD EES stocks separately. The value of n varied from 1 to 90. The number of
observed cases  N(n) was different for different n and varied from 6 to 15 for NK
LUKOIL and from 3 to 10 for RAO EES. The total number of  cases  ∑
=
=
90
1
)(
n
g nNN  was
also different:  Ng=515 for EESR and  Ng=1050 for LKON.
There exist two different  methods for verifying the original hypothesis. They
depend on how the construction of the structure tnRD )(  can be interpreted. The
variable tnRD )( can be interpreted as a realization of the difference between two random
variables ra(n) and rst(n). Then, to verify the original hypothesis, one must use the
Student criterion for comparing the mean values of two normal  samplings with different
unknown variances.  (It follows from the data available that the variables ra(n)  and rst(n)
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do not have equal variances.) On the other hand, tnRD )(  can be considered as a
realization of the random variable RD(n) with unknown variance. In this case,  by using
another t-statistics, one can also verify the hypothesis  that the mathematical expectation
is zero.
 We introduce the notation
∑ −∗
−
=
t
ataa nrnr
nN
ns 22 ))()((
1)(
1)( ,
∑ −∗
−
=
t
sttstst nrnr
nN
ns
22 ))()((
1)(
1)( ,
)(
)()(
))()(()(~
22
nN
nsns
nrnr
nt
sta
sta
∗
+
−
= .
It is a rather difficult problem to find the exact distribution function of the  )(~ nt -
statistics by comparing the mean values for two samplings. However, it is known that this
distribution is close to the Student distribution with ]][[ν  degrees of freedom, where
]][[ν  is the integral part of the number ν , and
)1)(()()(
))()((
22
222
−∗
+
+
= nN
nsns
nsns
sta
staν .
It is also known that if tnRD )(  is interpreted as a realization of the random variable
RD(n) with its unknown variance, then the variable
)(
)(
)()(
2
nN
ns
nRD
nt
RD
∗= ,  where  ∑ −∗
−
=
t
tRD nRDnRD
nN
ns
22 ))()((
1)(
1)( ,
satisfies the Student distribution with  (N(n)-1) degrees of freedom.
Although the above formulas are different, the use of two Student criteria on the
90% confidence interval leads to the same conclusions.
Conclusions. For the LKOH stocks for all 80;38;7;2≠n considered, one cannot
reject the hypothesis that the mean value is zero: 0)}({ =nRDE , while for the contract
durations n=2;7;38;80, the hypothesis is rejected in favor of the hypothesis that
0)}({ >nRDE .
For the EESR stocks for all 14;8;7≠n  considered, one cannot reject the hypothesis
that the mean value is zero 0)}({ =nRDE , while for the contract durations  n=7;8 the
hypothesis is rejected in favor of  0)}({ >nRDE  and for n=14 in favor of 0)}({ <nRDE .
Thus, for the majority of durations of futures contracts, we cannot say that the
futures market did not adequately «guess» relative changes in the stock price. Note that
this conclusion does not contradict the fact that there are many possibilities for realizing
profitable arbitrage operations.
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4. Conclusions
1. The dynamics of prices in the Russian stock market during the period from
September 1995 to September 1998 was mostly determined by the political events in
Russia rather than by the state of affairs in the real sector of economics.  The fact that the
price of Russian stocks increased five times during the period from September 1995 to
October 1997 and then returned to the original level in August 1998 is in no way related
to the basic macroeconomics characteristics in Russia.
The only financial index that behaved in a similar way was the value of gold and
currency reserves of the Central Bank of Russia. However, its variation was significantly
less, it varies only by 1.4 times.
2. A relatively high correlation between the RTS index and the gold and currency
reserves, as well as between the prices of 90- and 180-day GKO, makes it possible to
assume that there exists a common stochastic trend between these pairs of time series.
There is a probable explanation of this fact from the viewpoint of  players, i.e.,
participants in the financial market. But attempts to find cointegration of these time series
within the framework of the classical scheme meet the following principal difficulty: the
time series of the first differences are nonstationary. However, their nonstationarity is not
related to the «single root problem» in autoregression models.
3.  At the same time, dynamics like to the Russian one was exhibited by the
indices of the financial market in Venezuela. It is of interest to note that gold and
currency reserves in Russia and in Venezuela in 1996-1998 were of similar dynamics and
approximately of the same size. This fact also counts in favor of the hypothesis that there
is a weak relation between the dynamics of the stock market and the dynamics of the real
sector of economics in several developing countries.
4. Many theories describing the functioning of developed financial markets are
based on the essential assumption that arbitrage operations are impossible. It is assumed
that the market is organized so that the same arbitrage possibilities cannot exist for a long
time because of the information circulating in the market and a large number of
independent participants.  But the situation in the Russian futures and spot markets was
absolutely different from November 1996 to May 1998. There were rather long time
periods during which pure arbitrage operations with borrowed capital, future contracts for
stocks, and purchase-and-sell operations with stocks in the spot market could «bring
money from air». There were even more possibilities for quasi-arbitrage operations in the
futures and spot markets. The rate of return of these operations was significantly larger
than the rate of return in the GKO market.  (The difference between quasi-arbitrage and
arbitrage is that the player has an initial financial capital either as some money resources
or as a portfolio of stocks. In fact, this is an analog of bonds with a fixed interest but
realized in two markets simultaneously.)
Although the number of such «profitable» days was large, the futures price of
stocks could be used as an averaged estimate of the future price of stocks. More
precisely, on the 90% confidence interval, the observed data do not allow one to say  that
there are distinctions in the mean between the supposed and actual relative changes in the
stock prices almost for all contract durations form 1 to 90 days.
5. Apparently,  participants of the financial market understand very well that the
risks in any important operations in the Russian market are large.  A comparatively short
history of the Russian futures market is still another illustration of this fact. But the
possibility of a rapid increase in the capital attracted large financial resources, both
national and foreign. Nevertheless, the influence of these short-term portfolio investments
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on the real sector of economics was very weak. And the real sector could not be
attractive, since the rate of return in this market is low and the risks that credits will not
be returned are high.
6. One can formulate a hypothesis that, for countries with transient economics,
very high rates of increase in the stock index, which are not accompanied by a stable
economical growth, must be accompanied by a significant flow of short-term capital from
abroad and by existence of long-term arbitrage possibilities. These phenomena possess a
positive feedback.
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Appendix 2
In 1998 in Russia the situation in the market of stock exchange contracts of various
terms was such that the most part of this market was concentrated in Moscow.  The leader of
the Moscow futures market in volumes of operations was the Russian Stock Exchange. From
1994 to May 1998 the following contracts were traded in this market:
1)  currency futures;
2)  three types of GKO contracts:
3)  futures contract for the following stocks:
3a) packet of 100 stocks of  NK «Lukoil» (LKON - delivery data),
3b) packet of 1000 stocks of  Mosenergo (MSNG - delivery data),
3c) packet of 1000 stocks of  Rostelekom (RTKM - delivery data),
3d) packet of 10000 stocks of  RAO EES  (EESR - delivery data),
3e) packet of 10 stocks of  Sberbank of RF (SBER - delivery data).
The contracts for stocks are executed with respect to the positions that remain open on
the 14th of each month after the trade of these contracts is finished.
The annual trade volumes for all types of futures contracts are given in Table F1 on the
basis of the data published in Russian Stock Exchange Vestnik, 1, 1998.
Table F1
Year Annual trade volume
general Type of contracts
Currency GKO Stocks
$million $mill % $mill % $mill %
1994 37 37 100 – – – –
1995 2138 2129 99.5 9 0.5 – –
1996 5335 862 16 4446 83.5 27 0.5
1997 33852 – – 3340 10.5 28512 89.5
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